RN Collins (Series 2) No.17: Oversight Architecture in Psychedelic Regulation

RN Collins has written a series of 20 new articles for cannabis law report on 2026 Psychedelics & Legal Issues.

This is the 17th in a series of 20

Contact RN Collins: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rn-collins/

Abstract

Three states — Oregon, Colorado, and New Mexico — have enacted distinct state-level psilocybin service or access programs, each featuring a different regulatory architecture for licensing, administration, and oversight. This report examines the structural design of each program’s oversight mechanisms, identifies the principal variations in governance architecture, and benchmarks those designs against established principles for effective regulatory oversight. The report evaluates five dimensions of oversight architecture: (1) principal agency design, (2) advisory board structure and independence, (3) enforcement and compliance mechanisms, (4) data collection and transparency infrastructure, and (5) appellate and accountability pathways. Drawing on program documents, state agency rules, and legislative records, the report identifies significant gaps in current oversight designs and recommends structural improvements applicable to both existing programs and states currently developing new psychedelic regulatory frameworks.

I. Introduction

The emergence of state-licensed psychedelic programs has produced three distinct governance models within a four-year period. Oregon’s Psilocybin Services Act, enacted by ballot initiative in 2020, embeds program oversight within an existing public health agency — the Oregon Health Authority (OHA).¹ Colorado’s Natural Medicine Health Act, also a ballot initiative from 2022, divides oversight authority between two state agencies — the Department of Regulatory Agencies (DORA) and the Department of Revenue (DOR).² New Mexico’s Medical Psilocybin Act, enacted by the legislature in April 2025, places oversight with the New Mexico Department of Health (NMDOH) through a statutory advisory board framework.³

These programs have been designed without a common oversight template, reflecting the different political contexts in which they were adopted, the different regulatory philosophies of their designers, and the different stages of institutional development of psychedelic medicine. The resulting variation provides valuable comparative data on which governance structures are most likely to produce accountable, effective, and equitable regulatory programs.

This report proceeds from the premise that oversight architecture — the set of institutional relationships, authorities, and accountability mechanisms governing a regulatory program — is at least as important as the substantive rules a program enacts. Sound oversight architecture is what enables problems to be identified and corrected before they become entrenched; it is the institutional infrastructure for adaptive regulatory management. In the absence of sound oversight architecture, even well-designed substantive rules are vulnerable to drift, capture, and dysfunction.

II. Principal Agency Design

A. Oregon: Public Health Agency Integration

Oregon vested program authority entirely in the Oregon Health Authority, a cabinet-level state health department. OPS operates as a section within OHA’s Prevention and Wellness Division.⁴ This architecture has the advantage of leveraging OHA’s existing regulatory capacity for licensing, rulemaking, and enforcement, as well as embedding psilocybin oversight within a public health mission that emphasizes client safety and health equity. The integration also means that psilocybin program governance must compete for resources and attention with OHA’s many other programmatic responsibilities.

The single-agency model provides clear accountability — there is one point of contact for legislative oversight, one administrative law framework for contested cases, and one data collection infrastructure that can be aligned with OHA’s broader public health reporting obligations. Oregon Senate Bill 303 (2023), codified at ORS 475A.372 and ORS 475A.374, mandated quarterly data reporting by service centers to OPS and required OHA to share de-identified data with Oregon Health & Science University (OHSU) for research purposes — a transparency mechanism built into the single-agency structure.⁵

The principal limitation of the single-agency model is that it does not provide structural separation between program promotion and program oversight. OHA simultaneously serves as the program’s developer, administrator, and enforcer. This dual role can create institutional pressures toward compliance assistance rather than enforcement when problems arise, as has been documented in analogous programs administered by agencies with both promotional and regulatory missions.

B. Colorado: Bifurcated Agency Design

Colorado divided psilocybin program authority between two agencies along functional lines: DORA oversees the licensing and training of facilitators, while the Department of Revenue’s Natural Medicine Division oversees the licensing of healing centers and supply chain businesses — an architecture that legal commentators have described as “the most complex regulatory structure” of any state psilocybin program.⁶ This bifurcation mirrors the structure of Colorado’s cannabis regulatory program, in which DOR’s Marijuana Enforcement Division handles business licensing and DORA’s professional licensing divisions handle ancillary professional certifications.

The bifurcated model has theoretical advantages: by separating business regulation (supply chain integrity, financial compliance, premises standards) from practitioner regulation (training quality, scope of practice, facilitator conduct), it may enable each agency to develop domain-specific expertise. However, the separation also creates coordination challenges. Rules adopted by DORA governing facilitator qualifications must align with rules adopted by DOR governing healing center operations. A facilitator’s conduct during a session at a healing center is simultaneously within DORA’s jurisdiction (as a licensed practitioner) and DOR’s jurisdiction (as a participant in a licensed business operation). Enforcement actions implicating both dimensions require inter-agency coordination that the program’s enabling statute and initial rules did not fully resolve.

The Colorado legislature has already passed three bills modifying the Natural Medicine Health Act since Proposition 122’s adoption, including Senate Bill 25-297 (2025), which eased facilitator requirements and directed the state’s public health department to collect outcome data.⁷ This legislative iteration pattern is consistent with the experience of the Oregon program and suggests that complex oversight architectures require ongoing statutory maintenance that simple, single-agency designs can more easily accommodate.

C. New Mexico: Medical Agency with Advisory Board Architecture

New Mexico placed oversight authority in the New Mexico Department of Health, but structured the program around a newly created Medical Psilocybin Advisory Board responsible for developing regulatory frameworks and overseeing program implementation.⁸ New Mexico’s Medical Psilocybin Act (SB 219), signed by Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham on April 7, 2025, established qualifying conditions limited to major treatment-resistant depression, PTSD, substance use disorders, and end-of-life care, and authorized the NMDOH to administer the program through licensed clinicians — not lay facilitators — in approved treatment settings.⁹

Unlike Oregon and Colorado, New Mexico’s program requires a clinician to provide services — defined under the Act as “an approved health care provider licensed in New Mexico.”¹⁰ This clinician-administered model differs fundamentally from Oregon’s facilitator model: clinicians must hold existing professional licenses from their relevant health care boards, which means that program oversight is layered on top of pre-existing professional licensing oversight from boards such as the New Mexico Medical Board or the Counseling and Therapy Practice Board. This creates a distributed oversight structure in which the NMDOH is responsible for psilocybin program compliance, while pre-existing professional licensing authorities remain responsible for clinician competence and professional conduct.

The New Mexico Medical Psilocybin Advisory Board held its inaugural meeting on December 5, 2025, and announced plans to accelerate the program timeline — potentially launching a year earlier than the statutory deadline of December 31, 2027.¹¹ The seven-member board is responsible for establishing regulatory guardrails, including training and credentialing requirements, safety protocols, and data collection methods.¹² The legislature appropriated $2 million to NMDOH for program implementation, $1 million to the medical psilocybin research fund, and $1 million to the medical psilocybin treatment equity fund.¹³

D. Washington State: A Fourth Emerging Model

Washington State represents a fourth regulatory model in active development, directly relevant to this comparative analysis as the largest cannabis-regulated state bordering Oregon. Washington’s legislative history on psilocybin reflects a cautious, evidence-first approach. In 2023, the legislature enacted a substitute version of SB 5263 — after Governor Inslee vetoed the original bill that would have created an advisory board and regulatory framework — establishing instead a University of Washington Psilocybin Therapy Services Pilot Program for veterans and first responders and commissioning a Washington Psilocybin Task Force to develop regulatory recommendations.³⁸

The Washington Psilocybin Task Force, administered by the Washington Health Care Authority, issued its final report in December 2023. The report reviewed clinical evidence and evaluated regulatory structures, unanimously recommending: establishment of mandatory integration sessions; a low-dosage bracket not requiring facilitation sessions; and a regulatory framework modeled in part on Oregon’s non-medical approach but incorporating clinical oversight elements from New Mexico’s model.³⁹

In 2025, Senator Jesse Salomon introduced SB 5201, the Psychedelic Substances Act, proposing a bifurcated DOH/LCB regulatory structure — with the Department of Health overseeing service center and facilitator licensing and the Liquor and Cannabis Board overseeing cultivation and testing licensing — along with an 11-member Washington Psilocybin Board established within DOH.⁴⁰ SB 5201 stalled in the Senate Labor & Commerce Committee without a floor vote as of the close of the 2025 legislative session, but its framework is likely to be reintroduced. Notably, the bill included statutory client bill of rights provisions and explicitly prohibited localities from banning psilocybin businesses — a significant design departure from Oregon’s local opt-out model that produced the 100+ municipal bans documented in Report 1 of this series.

Washington’s emerging framework is significant for oversight architecture analysis because its eventual program will be administered by the Washington State Department of Health and the Liquor and Cannabis Board — the latter having administered cannabis regulation since 2012 with a mature proactive inspection infrastructure that contrasts sharply with OPS’s reactive compliance model. If enacted, Washington’s bifurcated DOH/LCB design would represent a second data point for the multi-agency oversight model alongside Colorado’s DORA/DOR structure, enabling future comparative assessment.

III. Advisory Board Structure and Independence

A. Oregon Psilocybin Advisory Board (OPAB)

Oregon’s original program established an advisory board to guide OHA’s rulemaking, but the OPAB’s composition and size have been revised by the legislature in response to criticism that it was disconnected from the lived experience of licensed providers. Oregon House Bill 2387 (2025) restructured the OPAB, reducing its size to nine members and requiring representation from tribal communities, mental health professionals, licensed service center operators, and licensed facilitators.¹⁴

The OPAB’s advisory rather than regulatory authority is a significant limitation. OPAB recommendations are not binding on OHA; the agency retains full discretion over final rulemaking. This limits the board’s effectiveness as an independent oversight mechanism and makes it a stakeholder consultation body rather than a governance authority. Legislative testimony preceding HB 2387’s passage acknowledged that a “disconnect” had emerged between agency rules and the experience of program participants, suggesting that advisory governance had not adequately translated operational knowledge into regulatory refinement.¹⁵

B. Colorado Natural Medicine Advisory Board (NMAB)

Colorado’s Natural Medicine Advisory Board was appointed by Governor Jared Polis and consisted of fifteen members with expertise in mycology, psychology, mental health, Indigenous cultural practices, and related fields.¹⁶ The NMAB made its first recommendations by September 30, 2024, as required by the Natural Medicine Health Act, and played a substantive role in developing the 107 pages of regulations governing the program.¹⁷

Colorado’s Advisory Board has formal authority to recommend adding new substances to the natural medicine program — beginning June 1, 2026, the board may recommend that DORA expand the program to include DMT, ibogaine, and mescaline.¹⁸ This substance-expansion authority gives the Colorado board a governance role beyond advisory consultation: its affirmative recommendations are prerequisites for program expansion. This design creates greater policy authority than Oregon’s purely advisory OPAB, while still stopping short of independent regulatory authority.

C. New Mexico Medical Psilocybin Advisory Board

New Mexico’s seven-member Medical Psilocybin Advisory Board was selected through a formal state application and review process and includes expertise from clinical, scientific, and community perspectives.¹⁹ Unlike Oregon’s and Colorado’s boards, which advise on a program already in operation, the New Mexico board is charged with creating the regulatory framework from the ground up — developing treatment protocols, safety guidelines, clinician and producer training requirements, and data collection methods.²⁰

The board’s role in New Mexico is therefore more constitutive in practice than advisory: because the program has no prior operational rules, its work product will in practice define the program’s foundational structure, giving it an outsized influence that exceeds its formal legal authority. The NMDOH Secretary retains final rulemaking authority under SB 219 § 7; the board’s recommendations are not binding. This design concentrates significant regulatory development influence in a seven-member body with limited staff support, and creates a risk that board member expertise, availability, and internal dynamics will have an outsized effect on the program’s foundational structure. The December 2025 announcement of an accelerated timeline was accompanied by community concern that acceleration should not compromise safety or public engagement.²¹

IV. Enforcement and Compliance Mechanisms

A. License Revocation and Administrative Sanctions

All three programs provide for license revocation, suspension, and administrative violations as primary enforcement mechanisms. Oregon’s OPS tracks final orders for license denials and administrative violations through its TLC system and publishes them on the OPS Data Dashboard.²² Colorado’s Natural Medicine Division similarly maintains enforcement authority over licensed businesses and facilitators, with DORA and DOR each holding jurisdiction over their respective license categories.²³ New Mexico’s program, still in development, has yet to publish enforcement protocols.

The effectiveness of these mechanisms depends critically on the capacity and incentives of the administering agency to initiate enforcement actions proactively. In Oregon, OPS has confirmed only two service center license denials through Q3 2025, with no denials in other categories — a pattern consistent with a compliance culture focused on entry and operator support rather than active enforcement.²⁴ The California Department of Cannabis Control’s experience provides a relevant benchmark: a 2025 performance audit found that the majority of DCC’s compliance inspections and investigations were “reactive, as they are initiated by complaints” rather than proactively scheduled — a finding that directly applies to Oregon’s OPS compliance model.²⁵

B. Complaint-Driven vs. Proactive Inspection Models

None of the three existing state psilocybin programs have published evidence of proactive, risk-based inspection programs with defined frequency standards and unannounced inspection protocols. This contrasts with mature regulatory models in other controlled substance domains — for example, state pharmacy boards typically conduct annual inspections of licensed pharmacies, and state medical marijuana programs in mature markets conduct proactive random inspections of licensed businesses.²⁶

The absence of proactive inspection capacity creates several oversight vulnerabilities. Violations that do not generate formal complaints — such as inadequate informed consent procedures, substandard product storage, or facilitator conduct concerns that clients are reluctant to report — will not be detected by complaint-driven enforcement alone. Supply chain integrity violations, including inadequate speciation testing or chain-of-custody failures, require on-site inspection to detect. And the risk of financial mismanagement in cash-heavy businesses — documented extensively in the Massachusetts Cannabis Control Commission audit — requires proactive financial auditing, not merely reactive complaint response.²⁷

C. Inter-Agency Enforcement Coordination

Colorado’s bifurcated model presents distinct inter-agency enforcement coordination challenges. A licensed facilitator employed by a licensed healing center who engages in misconduct during a session may face enforcement action from DORA (for facilitator license revocation under C.R.S. § 12-170-109), DOR (for healing center compliance under C.R.S. § 44-50-202), or both. Neither statute specifies how the two agencies are to coordinate concurrent enforcement actions, and no formal inter-agency enforcement coordination protocol has been published. The absence of such a protocol risks inconsistent outcomes and creates potential for enforcement gaps if each agency assumes the other is addressing a problem.

Both Colorado and Oregon have explicitly acknowledged that their programs do not exempt participants from federal law.²⁸ This means that any federal enforcement action against a program participant — for example, a DEA investigation of a licensed manufacturer for alleged CSA violations — occurs outside the state enforcement framework entirely. State agencies have no mechanism for coordinating with or responding to federal enforcement activity except through their own legal counsel, creating a potential gap between state compliance standing and federal legal exposure.

V. Data Collection and Transparency Infrastructure

A. Oregon’s SB 303 Data System

Oregon’s Senate Bill 303 (2023), codified at ORS 475A.372 and 475A.374, established the most comprehensive public data transparency system of any state psilocybin program. Beginning January 1, 2025, service centers are required to collect quarterly demographic data from clients, including income, gender identity, sexual orientation, county of residence, age, reasons for service, and adverse reactions.²⁹ This data is aggregated by OPS, shared with OHSU on a quarterly basis, and published on the OPS Data Dashboard.³⁰

The OPS Data Dashboard contains interactive pages covering safety outcomes, licensing status, compliance actions (including final orders), product and sales data, and applicant and client demographics.³¹ This public transparency infrastructure is the most developed of any state psilocybin program in the world and provides a model for other states and for federal program designers. Its limitations include client opt-out rights (clients may decline data submission), which introduces selection bias into the demographic dataset, and the fact that adverse event definitions are program-specific and not directly comparable to clinical trial adverse event standards.³²

B. Colorado Data Infrastructure

Colorado’s data infrastructure is less developed than Oregon’s at this stage of program operation, in part because the program only launched its first licensed session in June 2025. Colorado Senate Bill 25-297 (2025) directed the state Department of Public Health and Environment to collect outcome data on the health effects of natural medicine services — an initial step toward a public reporting system analogous to Oregon’s SB 303 framework.³³ As Colorado’s program matures, this data collection mandate will need to be operationalized through rulemaking that specifies reporting formats, timelines, and publication standards.

C. New Mexico’s Research and Equity Mandate

New Mexico’s Medical Psilocybin Act includes a medical psilocybin research fund and a medical psilocybin treatment equity fund — statutory mechanisms for supporting outcome research and reducing access barriers for underserved populations.³⁴ The legislature appropriated $1 million each to the research fund and the equity fund for fiscal year 2026 and subsequent fiscal years.³⁵ The research fund creates a statutory nexus between program data collection and academic evaluation, a structural feature that neither Oregon nor Colorado built into their initial program designs.

The advisory board is responsible for developing data collection methods to evaluate program effectiveness as part of its foundational regulatory development work.³⁶ This front-loaded approach to research infrastructure design offers the possibility of a more coherent evaluation framework than the retrospective data mandates adopted by Oregon and Colorado.

VI. Appellate and Accountability Pathways

A. Administrative Appeals

All three programs embed their enforcement decisions within state administrative law frameworks that provide for contested case hearings and judicial review. In Oregon, licensees subject to adverse licensing decisions may pursue contested case hearings through OHA’s administrative process under the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act (ORS Chapter 183). Colorado licensees may seek review through the state Office of Administrative Courts. New Mexico’s program will operate under the NMDOH administrative framework.

The availability of judicial review provides a meaningful backstop against arbitrary or procedurally deficient enforcement action. However, the cost and complexity of administrative appeals disadvantages small, individually-owned service centers and facilitators who cannot afford extended litigation, potentially creating de facto enforcement asymmetry in which larger operators can contest enforcement actions while smaller licensees cannot.

B. Legislative Oversight

All three programs are subject to legislative oversight through their respective state health and regulatory committees. Oregon’s OPAB restructuring through HB 2387 (2025) reflects active legislative engagement with program governance. Colorado’s legislature has passed three program modification bills since Proposition 122.³⁷ New Mexico’s SB 219 included a statutory co-sponsor, State Senator Jeff Steinborn, who attended the inaugural advisory board meeting and emphasized legislative expectations for innovation and speed.⁴¹

Legislative oversight provides periodic accountability but is not a real-time monitoring mechanism. The most significant accountability failures in cannabis regulation — documented in the Massachusetts CCC and California DCC audits — were identified through state auditor performance audits, not through legislative oversight mechanisms. All three psilocybin programs would benefit from mandatory periodic performance audits by their respective state auditor’s offices, with defined audit cycles, public reporting requirements, and agency response timelines.

VII. Comparative Oversight Architecture Assessment

The following matrix summarizes the oversight architecture of the three state psilocybin programs across five dimensions. Entries reflect the author’s assessment based on program documents, statutes, and published agency materials as of Q1 2026. Where evidence is mixed or the characterization is contested, the entry reflects the preponderance of available documentation.

VIII. Recommendations

For Oregon:

1. Establish a formal proactive inspection program with defined frequency benchmarks, unannounced inspection protocols, and public reporting of inspection activity.
2. Require periodic performance audits by the Oregon Secretary of State’s Audit Division on a biennial cycle, with public reporting and legislative transmission.
3. Address the OPS single-agency dual-mission tension by creating a dedicated compliance division within OPS with structural separation from the licensing function.

For Colorado:

1. Develop and publish a formal inter-agency enforcement coordination protocol between DORA and DOR specifying how concurrent enforcement actions involving both facilitators and healing centers will be coordinated.
2. Operationalize the SB 25-297 data collection mandate through rulemaking that establishes specific data elements, reporting formats, timelines, and a public dashboard analogous to Oregon’s OPS Data Dashboard.
3. Consider a joint DORA-DOR compliance committee with defined meeting frequency and shared information-sharing procedures to reduce enforcement gaps at the jurisdictional boundary.

For New Mexico:

1. Front-load the development of a data collection and public transparency framework in the Medical Psilocybin Advisory Board’s regulatory work.
2. Ensure the MPAB’s regulatory development process includes explicit provisions for proactive inspection authority and defined inspection protocols before the program launches.
3. Address the clinician licensing authority interface explicitly — specifying how NMDOH’s program enforcement authority interacts with the disciplinary authority of existing professional licensing boards.

For States Designing New Programs:

1. Adopt a single-agency model with clearly separated licensing and enforcement functions, rather than bifurcated multi-agency models.
2. Build public data transparency infrastructure into the program statute rather than adding it through subsequent legislation.
3. Designate an existing state auditor or inspector general office to conduct periodic performance audits from day one, funded through program licensing fees.

IX. Conclusion

The three existing state psilocybin programs reflect three different theories of regulatory governance: Oregon’s model emphasizes public health integration and transparent data collection; Colorado’s model emphasizes regulatory complexity and professional pathway differentiation; and New Mexico’s model emphasizes medical credentialing and research integration. Each design has distinct strengths and vulnerabilities.

Across all three programs, the principal structural gap is the absence of proactive, independent inspection capacity. The cumulative experience of cannabis regulatory audits — particularly in Massachusetts and California — demonstrates that this gap will eventually produce accountability failures. The most important lesson from comparative oversight design is that oversight architecture must be built into program design from the outset.

¹ Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 475A.100–475A.500; Oregon Health Authority, Oregon Psilocybin Services, https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/preventionwellness/pages/oregon-psilocybin-services.aspx.

² Colorado Proposition 122 (Natural Medicine Health Act), C.R.S. §§ 12-170-101 and 44-50-101; DLA Piper, State Psychedelic Regulation: Oregon and Colorado Taking the Lead (Jan. 2023), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/insights/publications/2023/01/state-psychedelic-regulation-oregon-and-colorado-taking-the-lead.

³ New Mexico SB 219, Medical Psilocybin Act (signed Apr. 7, 2025), full text at https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/25%20Regular/bills/senate/SB0219.HTML; Foley & Lardner, New Mexico Becomes Third State in the U.S. to Legalize Access to Psilocybin (Apr. 9, 2025), https://www.foley.com/insights/publications/2025/04/new-mexico-becomes-third-state-us-legalize-access-psilocybin/.

⁴ Oregon Health Authority, supra note 1 (OPS operates as a section within OHA’s Prevention and Wellness Division).

⁵ Oregon Senate Bill 303 (2023), codified at ORS 475A.372 and ORS 475A.374; Oregon Health Authority, Oregon Psilocybin Services – Senate Bill 303 and Data Collection Information, https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/preventionwellness/pages/psilocybin-sb303-and-data-collection.aspx.

⁶ DLA Piper, State Psychedelic Regulation: Oregon and Colorado Taking the Lead (Jan. 2023), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/insights/publications/2023/01/state-psychedelic-regulation-oregon-and-colorado-taking-the-lead (describing Colorado’s bifurcated DORA/DOR oversight structure); see also Vicente LLP, The Ultimate Guide to Colorado’s Natural Medicine Health Act (updated Aug. 2025), https://vicentellp.com/insights/ultimate-guide-to-sb23290-colorado-natural-medicine-psychedelics-regulation-and-legalization-bill/ (characterizing the dual-agency structure as the most administratively complex of any state psilocybin program).

⁷ Colorado Sun, Colorado, Oregon Are Leading More Than 20 Other States in Reform of Psychedelic Policy (July 3, 2025), https://coloradosun.com/2025/07/03/colorado-psychedelic-policy-reform/ (three bills passed since Proposition 122; SB 25-297 directed data collection and eased facilitator requirements).

⁸ New Mexico SB 219, supra note 3, § 6 (establishing Medical Psilocybin Advisory Board within NMDOH).

⁹ New Mexico SB 219, supra note 3, § 3(I) (qualifying conditions: major treatment-resistant depression, PTSD, substance use disorders, end-of-life care); id. § 3(B) (“clinician” means an approved health care provider licensed in New Mexico).

¹⁰ New Mexico SB 219, supra note 3, § 3(B).

¹¹ Source New Mexico, New Mexico Health Officials Aim to Kick Off Medical Psilocybin Program a Year Early (Dec. 8, 2025), https://sourcenm.com/2025/12/08/new-mexico-health-officials-plan-to-kick-off-medical-psilocybin-program-a-year-early/.

¹² KUNM, Legal Psychedelic Treatment Board to Hold First Public Meeting (Dec. 2, 2025), https://www.kunm.org/public-health-new-mexico/2025-12-02/legal-psychedelic-treatment-board-to-hold-its-first-public-meeting.

¹³ New Mexico SB 219, supra note 3, § 14 ($2 million appropriated to NMDOH for program implementation; $1 million each appropriated to the medical psilocybin research fund and the medical psilocybin treatment equity fund for fiscal year 2026 and subsequent fiscal years).

¹⁴ The Marijuana Herald, Oregon House Unanimously Approves Bill Expanding Psilocybin Access and Oversight (Apr. 15, 2025), https://themarijuanaherald.com/2025/04/oregon-house-unanimously-approves-bill-expanding-psilocybin-access-and-oversight/.

¹⁵ Oregon House Committee on Behavioral Health and Health Care, Testimony re HB 2387 (Mar. 17, 2025), https://apps.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2025r1/Downloads/PublicTestimonyDocument/157234.

¹⁶ Cannacore Group, Psychedelic Licensing in Colorado, https://www.cannacoregrp.com/psychedelics/colorado/ (15-member Natural Medicine Advisory Board appointed by Governor Polis).

¹⁷ Colorado Sun, Colorado Prepares Rollout of Psychedelic-Assisted Therapies in 2025 (Nov. 19, 2024), https://coloradosun.com/2024/11/19/colorado-psychedelic-assisted-therapies/ (22-month planning process; 107 pages of regulations).

¹⁸ Ballotpedia, Colorado Proposition 122, Decriminalization and Regulated Access Program for Certain Psychedelic Plants and Fungi Initiative (2022), https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Proposition_122,Decriminalization_and_Regulated_Access_Program_for_Certain_Psychedelic_Plants_and_Fungi_Initiative(2022) (Natural Medicine Advisory Board may recommend adding DMT, ibogaine, and mescaline after June 1, 2026).

¹⁹ Filter Magazine, New Mexico to Accelerate Launch of Therapeutic Psilocybin Access (Dec. 11, 2025), https://filtermag.org/new-mexico-accelerate-psilocybin-access/ (seven-member board selected after application and review process).

²⁰ New Mexico SB 219, supra note 3; New Mexico Department of Health, Medical Psilocybin Program, https://www.nmhealth.org/about/mcpp/mpp/.

²¹ Filter Magazine, supra note 19 (quoting Deborah Thorne: “Let’s be sure that any acceleration of the regulatory timeline doesn’t unintentionally compromise patient safety, undermine long-term sustainability or limit meaningful public engagement.”).

²² Oregon Health Authority, Oregon Psilocybin Services Data Dashboard, https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/preventionwellness/pages/psilocybin-data-dashboard.aspx.

²³ Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies, Natural Medicine Program, https://dpo.colorado.gov/NaturalMedicine; Snell & Wilmer, Colorado’s Magic Mushroom Industry Has Officially Arrived (Oct. 31, 2025), https://www.swlaw.com/publication/colorados-magic-mushroom-industry-has-officially-arrived/.

²⁴ Harris Sliwoski LLP, Oregon Psilocybin: State of the State (2024) (Dec. 2024), https://harris-sliwoski.com/psychlawblog/oregon-psilocybin-state-of-the-state-2024/ (OPS data confirm only two service center denials through program history).

²⁵ California Department of Finance, California Department of Cannabis Control Performance Audit (June 2025), https://oreports.dof.ca.gov/reportPdf/2278/California%20Department%20of%20Cannabis%20Control%20June%202025 (majority of DCC compliance activities “reactive, as they are initiated by complaints”).

²⁶ ASTHO, State Policies Supporting Evidence-Based Therapeutic Psilocybin Use, https://www.astho.org/communications/blog/state-policies-supporting-evidence-based-therapeutic-psilocybin-use/.

²⁷ Massachusetts Office of the State Auditor, Audit of the Cannabis Control Commission (July 1, 2022 – June 30, 2024), https://www.mass.gov/audit/audit-of-the-cannabis-control-commission-0.

²⁸ Or. Rev. Stat. § 475A.215(7); Colorado Proposition 122, § 1; DLA Piper, supra note 2 (both states explicitly limited the construction of their laws so that no one is exempt from federal law or its enforcement).

²⁹ Oregon Health Authority, SB 303 and Data Collection, https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/preventionwellness/pages/psilocybin-sb303-and-data-collection.aspx.

³⁰ Id. (data shared with OHSU quarterly under ORS 475A.372).

³¹ Oregon Health Authority, OPS Data Dashboard, supra note 22.

³² William R. Smith & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Safety of Supported Psilocybin Use in Oregon, Nat. Med. (2024), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12278778/ (discussing client opt-out rights and OPS adverse event definition limitations).

³³ Colorado Senate Bill 25-297, Implementation of Colorado Natural Medicine Initiative (signed June 3, 2025), https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/SB25-297 (directing CDPHE to collect data on health effects of natural medicine).

³⁴ New Mexico SB 219, supra note 3, § 14(B)–(C) (establishing medical psilocybin research fund and medical psilocybin treatment equity fund).

³⁵ New Mexico SB 219, supra note 3, § 14 ($1 million appropriated to research fund; $1 million appropriated to treatment equity fund for fiscal year 2026 and subsequent fiscal years).

³⁶ New Mexico Department of Health, Medical Psilocybin Program, supra note 20.

³⁷ Colorado Sun, supra note 7.

³⁸ Washington Health Care Authority, Washington Psilocybin Task Force Final Report (Dec. 2023), https://www.hca.wa.gov/assets/program/psilocybin-task-force-leg-report-2023.pdf (Task Force established by enacted substitute to SB 5263; final report issued December 1, 2023; unanimous recommendations on regulatory structures, mandatory integration sessions, and low-dosage bracket).

³⁹ Id.

⁴⁰ Washington SB 5201, Psychedelic Substances Act, 2025-26 Leg. Sess. (Wash. 2025), https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5201&Year=2025&Initiative=false (introduced January 2025 by Sen. Jesse Salomon; bifurcated DOH/LCB regulatory structure; 11-member Washington Psilocybin Board within DOH; stalled in Senate Labor & Commerce Committee without floor vote as of close of 2025 legislative session).

⁴¹ Source New Mexico, supra note 11 (State Senator Jeff Steinborn attended inaugural advisory board meeting; emphasized legislative expectations for innovation and speed).